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Introduction
The notion of collective invention has been introduced in the literature by Allen (1983) who provides evidence from the 19 th century iron and steel industry where innovative success was the result of the cooperative activities of several, different actors. Anecdotal evidence such as Allen's or from the various studies on Silicon Valley or other success stories of regional innovation was enriched by studies on the regional dimension of knowledge flows (Jaffe et al. 1993) . Insights into the process of innovation on the firm-level (Kline and Rosenberg 1986) or the national level (Lundval 1992) strengthened the view that innovation systems are the basic factor of innovation-based economic success.
There exists a large number of investigations building on the systems view in relating innovative activities and success. 1 Those analyses are often of a static nature and focus on the number and kind of actors involved (public versus private), the technology fields pursued, and the political devices installed. The focus shifts between the modes of interaction between actors (formally or informally), the kinds of interaction that can be distinguished (cooperative research projects versus researcher mobility), and the geographical dimension of interaction (within the region or extra-regional).
This paper is an attempt to extend the static view by providing case study based insights into the dynamic, developmental or evolutionary pattern of regional innovation systems. For that,
we provide an analysis of the development of the innovation network of Jena between 1995 and 2001. At this point, we cannot provide a coherent theory of the evolution of networks, but we try to base our analysis on some theoretical building blocs that we consider central for such a theory in the future. In section 2 we briefly discuss the basic theoretical arguments.
Section 3 introduces the case of Jena and our database, while in section 4 we present our empirical results. The final section 5 puts those results into the perspective of an evolutionary approach towards the development of a regional innovation system.
Theoretical building blocs
Innovation networks are built up by actors which cooperatively engage in the creation of new ideas and then economize on the results. To get an idea how those systems evolve, one may look at the structure of cooperative activities (number, intensity, type, continuity, results, 1 For an overview see Edquist (2004) .
geographical as well as the social dimension) and how they change over time. Thus, we consider the evolution of an innovation system driven by decisions to cooperate.
A main element of cooperative innovative activities is the exchange of technological knowhow. In this context one may ask why actors are interested in this exchange. The resource based view of the firm suggests a firm to be considered as an ensemble of specific resources which are unique, valuable and difficult to imitate (Barney 1991) . Technological knowledge and technological capabilities are considered to be of that type since they are accumulated over time, show path-dependency and by that are unique to the firm (Teece 1986 ). This provides a firm with a certain technology based competitive advantage which may allow her to reap higher profits. However, they also may constrain the firm in pursuing further progress because for that, additional or different knowledge and competencies are required.
The constraining property of knowledge resources in the above sense may induce firms to extend their knowledge base and their repertoire of capabilities. One way to achieve that would be investment in own learning and R&D. However, as such activities seem to be characterized by cumulativeness and path dependency, they may finally lead to a technological lock-in. In such a situation, a firm's accumulated knowledge and competencies are not suitable anymore to solve the current problems. Hence, it may lay in the interest of that firm to get access to knowledge and competences provided by other actors, may that be firms or public institutions. Besides this, cost considerations may play a role in the sense that it may be less costly to acquire external knowledge, rather than building it up within the firm.
For that to work, formalized R&D cooperative arrangements are one way, another one the informal exchange of knowledge. In both, the exchange of knowledge and competences is ruled either by a formal contract or by an informal agreement governed by trust and fairness.
For knowledge exchange to be effective, the following factors are relevant:
o A certain degree of technological proximity or technological relatedness between the actors is required in the sense that technical problems can be solved commonly (Mowery et al 1998 , Cantner and Graf 2004 , 2006 , Cantner and Meder 2007 .
o The knowledge bases of the (potential) cooperation partners should be different and show a certain degree of complementarity; at least should the partners expect those complementarities. In this context also important is the degree of reciprocity which especially in the case of informal know-how exchange gains importance.
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o Even when the two former conditions are met, actors have to have some abilities or absorptive capacities to understand the technological knowledge of others (Cohen and Levinthal 1989) .
o Geographical proximity (the other is located in not too far distance) as well as social proximity (the other is known or can easily approached) are often helpful to find the appropriate cooperation partner, especially when we think of informal exchange or the transfer of so-called tacit knowledge (Breschi and Lissoni 2003, Boschma 2005) .
o In a dynamic context, for the exchange of knowledge between actors to be repeated and continued, factors such as success, trust, and learning to cooperate become relevant in addition. we find that the likelihood of two actors cooperating in period t is negatively affected by cooperation between these actors in period t-1 (Cantner and Graf 2006) . Moreover, if potentials within the own social or geographical region diminish, the search and knowledge exchange will surpass those boundaries and become externally oriented. Aggregating those observations from the bilateral level to the system level of networks may induce certain pattern of system development. Here, Cantner and Graf (2004) find that the more a region is specialized technologically, and thus the less complementary know-how is available there, the more external relationships to exchange know-how are observed. Putting this result into a dynamic perspective, a system's development towards increasing cooperative arrangements and connectedness can be distinguished from a development towards fragmentation accompanied by loosening of coherence and cooperation. In the former case technological potentials -being abundant or built up by cooperation -are exploited cooperatively, whereas in the latter case just by cooperating less and less technological potentials remain available and the benefits of cooperation diminish.
For the present case study, we attempt to identify some elements of those development patterns. We start with observations on the changing composition of the network and of the Obviously, to find some explanation for the changing structure of innovation networks, we have to take an actor perspective and use information on the technological relationships among them. What we have to neglect or can only indirectly infer are the motivations and further determinants that lead an actor to engage in network cooperation.
The case and the data
The above introduced five dimension of a developing innovation system are analyzed for the case of the local innovation network of Jena between 1995 and 2001. Hence, we do not look at the local innovation system of Jena but at a subset of this system, the network of innovators. Thus, we leave out political actors, norms and institutions which are considered as additional core actors and elements of a local innovation system. In order to track the development of the Jena innovators network, we distinguish two sub periods, 1995-1997 labeled p1 and 1999-2001 labeled p2. We leave out 1998 in order to have the two sub periods of equal length of three years and to have a clear separation between them.
We construct the network of innovators by using information from applications at the German Patent Office and select those, with at least one inventor residing in Jena. For the period under consideration, we take into account 1114 patent applications, with 334 applicants and 1827
inventors from which 977 are located outside Jena. We distinguish between the technological potential to cooperate, the kind of relationships of the cooperating actors, and the geographical dimension of the relationships. From the patent information we have at hand, these relationships or dimensions can be constructed in the following way: First, there is a potential to cooperate between actors if they apply within the same technology class.
Secondly, if for a specific patent we find more than one applicant (co-application), then we consider this as cooperation (co) between those applicants. Third, if we find patents by distinct applicants on which the same inventor is stated, we consider the applicants of these patents to be connected via scientist mobility (smo) -seemingly, this inventor worked for all the applicants. Fourth, the regional dimension is taken into account by looking at the location of the applicants. In case of a relationship between applicants located in Jena the respective knowledge flows are internally oriented. An external orientation of a relationship shows up when a local actor is linked to an actor located outside of Jena.
Results
Actor development Table 1 gives a first view on the development of the network in terms of the actors involved.
The network size increased as the total number of innovators jumped from 139 in the first period to 189 in the second period. 32 innovators are members of the network in both periods, 107 actors exited between p1 and p2 and 157 entered. Within the group of permanent innovators, 37.5 % are not located in Jena but are related to actors in Jena. The share of external partners which exit or which enter the network is larger than 50 % in both cases with a slightly higher percentage in the case of entering actors. This can be interpreted as a slight tendency of the Jena innovator network to become more externally oriented. The network of innovators and its change over time
In a next step, we look at relationships between the innovators via common inventors; i.e. the network of personal relationships (pr). Herein, we combine the two types, cooperation co and scientist mobility smo -as defined above. Figure 1 shows the pr-network where we distinguish the co-network with black edges and the sm-network with grey edges.
In . Looking at that indicator we find a decrease in the co-network (0.029 to 0.027) and a rather constant value for the smo-network (0.010). The overall effect is dominated by the effects of cooperation, which leads to a pr-network which is less dense in the second period (0.040 to 0.037). This result suggests that the relative intensity of knowledge flows decreased.
However, the density measure is not invariant to the size of the network. We therefore look at the mean degree as another measure of connectedness which is defined as Another structural measure for a network is the overall clustering coefficient, where an increase hints towards local coherence, i.e. intensified grouping of actors in densely connected clusters. It is calculated by averaging the clustering coefficients of all actors within the network. The node level clustering coefficients are calculated as the density of the neighborhood, i.e. the network of actors directly linked to the respective actor. For all three networks we find less clustering in the second compared to the first period and thus less intense grouping of the actors. The average distance between actors measures the ease of knowledge flows and is often related to the rate of knowledge diffusion (Cowan and Jonard 2004) . For the co-and the smo-network, we find an increase whereas for the total pr-network this measure decreases. This seems to indicate that there is a complementary relation between knowledge flows via cooperation and via scientist mobility.
Summarizing these results, we find a decreasing fragmentation combined with a higher degree of connectedness where the large, core actors within the network increasingly focus on formal cooperation while the smaller, surrounding or peripheral actors rather intensify their contacts through informal, personal relations. In the following we, want to identify the determinants of this increasing connectedness of the Jena network of innovators which took place despite an increase in the total number of actors.
Potential to cooperate
As noted above, technological relatedness is one of the preconditions for actors to cooperate and to exchange knowledge. Any increase in this relatedness may be a cause for personal relations to become more frequent and for the whole system to become more interconnected.
In this sense, technological relatedness or proximity can be interpreted as the potential to Table 3 shows the statistics with respect to this network. Obviously the cohesion of the network increases -according to the measures density and mean degree -with the number of actors from p1 to p2. Thus the potential to cooperate increased over time. Since we consider a very broad concept of technological overlap with only 30 technological classes, the networks of both periods are highly connected. For each we observe roughly 95 % of the actors being part of the largest component. The potential network has become increasingly connected as evidenced by the measures of density (0.15 to 0.17) and also by an increase of the mean degree from 19.2 to 28.7. We also find an increase in the centralization of the network from 0.6 to 0.7, which means that peripheral actors in the network are stronger connected to actors in the center and/or less connected to other peripheral actors. The overall clustering coefficient slightly decreases from 1.23 in the first period to 1.20 in the second period. At the same time, the average distance between actors decreases from 2.00 to 1.88.
Summarizing, we find increasing cohesion, which is interpreted as a stronger focus on core competencies or technologies, where the fields of activity of the central actors become increasingly important for the whole network. With respect to the increased connectedness of the pr-network we can conclude that the increasing potential to cooperate seemingly goes hand in hand with this change over time.
As we recall from table 1, the number of actors changes between p1 and p2 with only 32 actors being part of the network in both periods. We thus ask whether the observed increasing technological cohesion can be related to the following three groups of actors -entering , exiting, and permanent innovators. Calculating mean degrees for these different groups, we distinguish between relations within the group and between the groups. The resulting values and tests for the significance of differences between the mean degrees are given in table 4.
Since we cannot assume a normal behaviour of the degrees of the network members, we perform the nonparametric Mann-Whitney or Wilcoxon rank sum test to examine our above reasoning. The tests are performed by column, i.e., we compare exiting innovators of the first period with the entering innovators of the second period and so on. Regarding the different roles of exiting innovators and entrants, we observe a stronger connectivity within the entering group itself (18.191 compared to 8.729 for the exiting group), but also with respect to the linkages with the permanent group (7.592 compared to 6.738 for exit). While the former observation, that entrants are a more homogeneous group, is significant, the latter is not on an acceptable level of significance (p-value of 0.208). The values in the third and fourth column are based on the same number of connections but in calculating the mean they are divided by a different number of focal actors. Accordingly, we notice more technological connections between the permanent innovators and the entering innovators (37.250) as compared to the exiting group (22.531). The permanent innovators themselves increase their technological overlap significantly between the two periods from 15.125 to 19.563.
With respect to our previous result of an increasing cohesion of the network of technological overlap, the findings here indicate that both, the permanent innovators as well as the entrants (compared to the exiting innovators) tend to increasingly concentrate on the technological core competencies of the network as a whole. And with respect to the increasing connectedness of the pr-network, we presume that the permanent actors' degree to cooperate should have increased between p1 and p2, and the degree to cooperate with entrants should have been higher than with exiters.
Entry and exit to the network In order to develop further on this presumption, we compute mean degrees for several groups of actors in both subperiods with respect to the personal relationships. We again distinguish between relationships based on cooperations (co) and on mobility (smo). The respective results are stated in table 5 and 6. In the last column of both tables the permanent innovators themselves (fourth column in tables 5 and 6) show a significant increase in linkages through cooperation (from 2.563 to 3.938) and especially in scientist mobility (from 0.938 to 2.500). Thus, parallel to the increased technological overlap in this group, the connectedness among the incumbents becomes more intense over time.
The first column in both tables regards the comparison of the connectedness between exiting and entering innovators within their respective group. The exiting innovators show significantly (p=0.066) more linkages through cooperation than the entering group (3.084 versus 2.242) and slightly, but not significantly more linkages through scientist mobility (0.561 versus 0.497). The second and third columns report the mean degree between permanent and exiting innovators in p1 and between permanent and entering innovtors in p2.
The two columns differ with respect to the group of actors for which this index is computed, for the exiting or entering innovators in column 2 and for the permanents in column 3. For the co-network in column 2, we find that entering innovators cooperate significantly (p = 0.003) more with the permanent ones than the exiting innovators did (1.516 versus 0.710). With respect to the smo-network, entering innovators have also more linkages through scientist mobility (0.637 versus 0.514) even though not to a significant degree. Summarizing these results, innovative entrants in Jena seem to be better integrated into the network of personal relations than actors who, for whatever reasons, stopped innovating. This finding is consistent with results of Powell et al. (1999) that the network position has an important influence on firm performance. The observations regarding the connectedness of entering and exiting innovators within their group are not contradictive to our argument.
Actors that enter such a network are certainly more aware of incumbents than of actors which enter during the same period. Knowledge about other potential partners for knowledge exchange needs time to develop.
Regional dimension
Another question, regarding increasing connectedness of the Jena innovator network, is related to the issue whether this is due to an increase of internal relationships or whether more external partners are responsible for this development. In the former case, this could be in indication for the danger to get into a technological lock-in situation, in the latter case, external pipelines may protect against such kind of unfortunate situation (see Bathelt et al. 2004) . From Table 1 we take that the share of external actors increased slightly from about 54 % in p1 to 58 % in p2, suggesting that knowledge exchange with external partners tends to intensify over time.
In Table 7 , we present a more fine grained analysis of these external relations. We distinguish relations between only internal actors (internal) on the one hand and between an internal and an external partner (external) on the other. Their development from p1 to p2 as well as the respective development of the ratio between the two is stated for both types of relations (co and smo) and for different types of actors (private vs. public, persistent vs. non-persistent).
For the co-network we find that both external and internal increase in absolute numbers over time. However, the increase in internal is comparatively larger, leading to a decrease of the ratio external/internal. Thus, the development of the co-network clearly shows an increasing inward orientation in relative terms (from 1,682 to 1,563) although in absolute terms the number of external actors in the network has been increasing. The same holds true for the smo-network (from 2,000 to 1,605).
In view of these results, in a further step we distinguish between private and public actors to see if certain types of actors are responsible for the observed development. The results in table 7 indicate that while in both groups, we observe an increasing inward orientation (the share external/internal always decreases), this tendency seems much more pronounced for the public actors compared to private actors -compare the decline for public actors in the conetwork (smo-network) from 1.857 to 1.524 (from 1.769 to 1.273) for the public actors to the decline from 1.649 to 1.593 (from 2.091 to 1.741) for the private actors.
If we alternatively distinguish between persistent innovators and the ones that exit or enter, we find that for these groups, the development goes into different directions. We find that the entrants are on average more outward oriented than the actors that exited the network; hence in Summarizing these results we find that even though the share of external actors in the Jena network of innovators increased slightly over time, linkages within the region enlarged their share. This tendency is especially true for public actors but for private ones as well.
Distinguishing actors according to their presence in the network, we find a development in opposing directions. Persistent actors are increasingly inward oriented, while for nonpersistent actors we find that entrants are more outward oriented than the exiting innovators.
The antenna function, persistent and central actors -especially universities -are assumed to fulfil, seemingly shows diminishing importance, at least in relative terms.
Conclusion
In this paper we discuss some issues pertaining to the development or evolution of innovation networks. Firms, heterogeneous in the technological knowledge and competences, that seek to cooperate do so for getting access to other firms knowledge and exchange it against own know-how. Connecting such cooperative actors within one region, one ends up at a system or network of innovating firms. Consisting of bilateral knowledge relationships, the network of innovators may change its size and its structure over time, new relationships come into existence, existing relationships may be cancelled, new actors join the system, and other actors leave it. Based on those structure generating factors one can presume that the system as a whole in some periods tends to get more coherent and the actors to be more connected, whereas in other periods the tendency to disconnect and to weaken the system may prevail.
Our study represents just the case where the technological potentials for cooperation increased over time accompanied by a growth in the number of actors involved and a higher connectedness among them. These tendencies are nicely related to the specific contributions of permanent, entering, and exiting actors, as well as of actors internal to the region of Jena and those which are external. Exiters tend to be less integrated into the innovators network than entrants. Although the share of external actors increased over time the share of external linkages diminishes over time. Thus we observe an increasing orientation of the network's innovation activities with internal partners. The fact that permanent actors strongly intensify their internal relations seems to be the main driver of this development.
